







Nuclear energy has a role to play in Canada’s electrical generation
mix, based on cost and environmental grounds.
NO. 290, JUNE 2009
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONCanada is at an energy and environmental crossroad. Fossil fuels cause
environmental damage and the growth potential of large-scale hydroelectricity is
limited. Policymakers are reconsidering the merits of nuclear power as both a low-
carbon emitting and low-cost base load electricity source. 
While nuclear power may look like an attractive option, nuclear power must
overcome problems such as the high and uncertain cost of construction, dealing
with nuclear waste, reactor licensing and regulation, and the future of Canada’s
nuclear reactor builder, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a federal Crown
corporation.
We examine three key policy questions facing the nuclear industry: cost,
privatization of AECL, and regulation.
First, nuclear power is likely cost competitive with fossil fuels once the social costs of
all energy are accounted for. Nuclear power already internalizes far more of its social
costs and potential liabilities than fossil fuels and the introduction of a carbon price
will place the two on a level playing field.
Second, AECL should be partially privatized to bring stable funding, new
international partnerships, and market capacity and discipline. However, a
privatization deal should include continuing support, public or private, for pure
research and development at the Chalk River, Ontario laboratories.
Third, Ottawa should review the array of nuclear regulatory regimes across different
nuclear risks, from isotope manufacturing to reactor licensing to long-term waste
storage. The commercial nuclear reactor licensing process will also need revision if a
nuclear electricity renaissance is to occur in Canada.
The future of nuclear power in Canada is positive – if policymakers can resolve these
key issues.
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C
anada faces a unique set
of nuclear issues in the
context of its broader
energy and environmental
policy. 
The country has ample supplies of fossil fuels, but
they contribute to a less-than-stellar record on
climate change (see, for example, Jaccard 2007;
Eberlein and Doern forthcoming). 
It is, however, the world’s leading producer and
exporter of uranium, and it has developed its own
unique reactor design, the CANDU, in the hands of
a federal Crown corporation, Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL). CANDU reactors already
supply 52 percent of the electricity in Ontario, and
the federal and Ontario governments now face
important policy decisions about the future of the
nuclear industry and, more specifically, about the
funding and organization of AECL, including its
laboratories at Chalk River, Ontario.
In this Commentary, we examine three questions
and the appropriate policy responses to those
questions. First, given the need to meet rising
electricity demand while reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) and other emissions, is nuclear power a
competitive option in the current policy framework?
We conclude that nuclear energy is amply justified
as a part of Canada’s future electricity energy mix on
both energy and environmental grounds. This is
based partly on nuclear energy’s advantage of low
GHG and other emissions, and partly on the ability
of nuclear power to provide base load power, in
tandem with a range of alternative energy sources
for variable intermediate and peak power needs. We
also argue that policymakers should ensure that the
environmental costs of fossil fuel energy sources are
internalized in energy prices to the same extent as
they already are for nuclear energy. Fossil-fuel-based
energies currently do not need to pay for emitting
their CO2 waste, while nuclear facilities pay for
most of the direct and contingency costs of dealing
with radioactive waste.
Second, should AECL be privatized? We argue
that it should be, at least partially. Partial
privatization would bring the needed funding,
ownership and partnership structures, and capacities
required for the corporation to compete globally.
Federal support for Chalk River and other related
investments would still be needed, so full
privatization likely is not a viable option. However,
any approach to partial privatization – whether
through the establishment of a new mixed
enterprise corporation or through the sale of AECL’s
commercial assets and activity to a private company
or companies – would have to deal effectively with
the needed public goods research and development
(R&D) functions of the Chalk River laboratories.
Indeed, any final partial privatization package
should include Chalk River’s development and
restructuring as a joint publicly and privately
funded national laboratory.
Third, is there a need for new approaches to
nuclear regulation? We argue that federal
policymakers should establish regulatory review
mechanisms across the array of nuclear regulatory
bodies and agencies and the complete range of
nuclear risks. These mechanisms should assess
periodically the changing relative risks and ways to
manage them, including funding needs related to
regulatory capacity. The Nuclear Safety and Control
Act also needs to be amended to ensure public safety
while recognizing the obligations of both the
regulator and the federal government for effective
and efficient reactor licensing. In addition,
policymakers need to demonstrate concrete
progress, including with respect to the regulatory
and approval process, on site selection for a nuclear
waste management facility, since this is an
important factor in public approval and would
remain a crucial and continuing federal policy need
even if the nuclear industry were to be closed down. 
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Electricity Supply, Climate Change,
and Costs
Given Canada’s rising demand for electricity and
the need to reduce GHG and other emissions, is
nuclear power a competitive option in the current
policy framework? We argue that the use of nuclear
energy is amply justified as part of Canada’s future
electricity energy mix on both environmental
grounds (its low-to-zero GHG and other emissions)
and energy grounds (its ability to provide base load
power, in tandem with alternative energy sources
for variable intermediate and peak power needs).
We begin with the situation in Ontario and, briefly,
in other provinces. We then deal with the
environmental, climate change, and related cost
and subsidy factors of nuclear energy compared
with other sources of electricity supply.
Ontario’s Demand for Nuclear Energy as a
Source of Base Load Power 
Whatever the merits of nuclear energy, its future in
Canada will be decided by actual orders, both
foreign and domestic, for AECL’s new advanced
CANDU reactor (ACR). Ontario has been and will
continue to be Canada’s major domestic market for
nuclear power, although the annual growth of
demand for energy in the province has been
negative for the past several years due to slow
economic growth, restructuring toward less
electricity-intensive activities, and improvements in
efficiency. With the current economic crisis,
moreover, demand is forecast to continue to decline
over the next few years (IESO 2009).
Current Ontario policy limits the production of
nuclear power in the province to its historical
maximum of 14,000 megawatts (MW). At present,
CANDU reactors supply most of Ontario’s base
load, with some help from hydro and coal. Current
nuclear capacity is 11,300 MW, based on 16
operating CANDU units at the Pickering and
Darlington power stations, owned by the Ontario
government through its Crown corporation Ontario
Power Generation, and at the Bruce power station,
which is leased to Bruce Power, a private
consortium. When two units at Bruce currently
being refurbished are returned to service, nuclear
capacity will increase to 13,000 MW.
Ontario’s more variable intermediate and peak
load requirements for electricity are now supplied
mainly by coal and natural gas. Under the Ontario
Integrated Power System Plan, however, coal-fired
power is to be phased out by 2014, to be replaced by
a combination of natural gas and wind and an
increase in nuclear power through the refurbishment
of current plants and the building of two new
nuclear plants at Darlington. Conservation and the
use of renewable energy sources will also be strongly
encouraged. 
Ontario’s new reactors will be purchased on a
competitive basis. AECL, with its ACR, is
competing for this business with new light water
reactor (LWR) designs by both Westinghouse-
Toshiba and Areva, a reactor and fuel cycle
corporation that is majority owned by the French
government and already has four projects under
construction. In the export market, AECL also faces
tough competition from these and other vendors,
including a partnership between General Electric
and Hitachi. Ontario will base its purchasing
decision on the criteria of low lifetime power cost,
the ability to meet Ontario’s schedules, and the level
of investment in Ontario. On this last factor, at least,
unless other vendors also use Ontario labour and
subcontractors, AECL should have an edge over its
competitors, since all of Ontario’s current nuclear
power comes from CANDU reactors, most of the
CANDU suppliers are in Ontario, and AECL itself
is Ontario based. Yet, although nuclear energy is
important to Ontario, not just for the electricity it
supplies but for the jobs in research and
development, design, and manufacturing, the
province sees the economic benefit of the first two
factors, cost and timing, as much greater than the
economic benefit gained through investment and
local spending (Infrastructure Ontario 2008).
Moreover, vendors other than AECL might offer
access to new technologies and markets, as well as
offset business for Ontario to compensate for the loss
of CANDU activities should the province not
choose AECL. Clearly, Ontario’s purchase decision
will have a profound influence on the future of
AECL and the nuclear industry in Canada and,
hence, on federal nuclear energy policy. Commentary 290 | 3
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Nuclear Developments in Other Provinces 
The future of AECL’s ACR reactor program
depends to some extent on whether provinces other
than Ontario express an interest in it and adopt it
as a part of their energy strategy. New Brunswick
and Quebec already have one CANDU reactor
each; Alberta and Saskatchewan have not used
nuclear power to date but are in the very early
stages of considering its adoption.
New Brunswick is actively looking for funding for
a new reactor to complement the existing CANDU
reactor at Point Lepreau, where AECL is carrying out
a $1.4 billion refurbishment project. The bid to
install an ACR has been put forward by Team
CANDU, a consortium of AECL and private firms,
which is proposing a merchant model whereby the
consortium, rather than the provincial government,
would undertake the project risk.
1 Half of the new
reactor’s output would be exported to the United
States. Since New Brunswick does not want to own a
one-of-a-kind reactor, it is looking for the federal
government either to invest in AECL to ensure that
the company can compete globally or privatize it and
let investors make it competitive (New Brunswick
2008). A first order from New Brunswick for a new
reactor would be a strong endorsement from an old
CANDU customer. 
Quebec will refurbish its existing CANDU unit,
but is not in the market for more reactors. Rather,
its electricity policies are centred more on new
hydroelectric power, including projects with long-
term northeastern US markets in mind.
Alberta’s current electricity supply is largely based
on coal and natural gas, and the province will need
5,000 MW of new electricity capacity by 2017. It is
under pressure, however, to reduce its GHG
emissions, especially from the oil sands (Bratt
2008). Bruce Power is considering the possibility of
building nuclear reactors to supply power to the oil
sands, displacing natural gas. In March 2008, it
announced that it had bought an Alberta company
active in promoting nuclear power, and filed an
application with the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) for approval to prepare a site
that would generate 4,000 MW from two to four
reactors. Alberta is also looking at carbon capture
and storage (Cattaneo, 2008), which could be seen
as the main cost competition for nuclear power in
dealing with emissions from the oil sands provided
considerable technological obstacles and regulatory
uncertainties can be overcome.
Bruce Power is also studying the possibility of
building a nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan
(Jones 2008), whose premier sees it as a way of
adding value to the province’s uranium resources
(Bratt 2008). 
Provincial support for AECL’s new reactor model
could provide a domestic base for exports, a benefit
that would accrue both to the federal government
through an increased market value for AECL and
to Ontario through additional jobs in the nuclear
industry. Without provincial support, however, the
federal government would have less motivation to
maintain the technology and the market value of
AECL would decline. 
Nuclear Energy’s Role in Climate Change
and Improved Air Quality
Central to governmental decisions about future
nuclear power use in Canada is whether the low level
of GHG and other emissions from nuclear power
can tip the balance in favour of its increased role in
the electricity supply mix. A reduction of emissions
also would have direct implications for nuclear
energy’s costs vis-à-vis those of its competitors.
Canada’s current GHG emissions total 721
megatonnes per year of CO2-equivalent, of which
fossil-fired electricity, mainly coal, contributes 115
megatonnes per year, or 16 percent of the total
(Canadian Electricity Association 2006, 8). To meet
its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, which
clearly will not happen on schedule, Canada would
need to reduce its emissions by about 160
megatonnes of CO2-equivalent per year from
current levels (Environment Canada 2006). A
1,000 MW CANDU reactor running 80 percent of
1 See “Team Candu ready to proceed with second Point Lepreau reactor without government funding,” Daily Commercial News and Construction
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the time would avoid about 6 megatonnes of CO2-
equivalent per year if the alternative were coal and
half that much if the alternative were natural gas.
Canada’s currently active nuclear capacity of 13,000
MW offsets about 80 megatonnes of CO2-
equivalent per year compared to coal, so nuclear
energy is already making a big contribution to
limiting Canada’s GHG emissions.
The Limitations of Environmental 
NGO Analyses 
Most environmental nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in Canada are strongly
opposed to nuclear energy (for example, see
Winfield et al. 2006). For example, one argument
with respect to GHG emissions of nuclear power is
“while the GHG emission profile of nuclear power
looks attractive when compared with conventional
fossil fuel sources, it is far from zero” (Pembina
Institute 2007). The dispute with the nuclear
industry’s claims of zero GHG emissions is based
on a life-cycle analysis that takes into account
GHG emissions from activities such as uranium
mining, fuel processing, and waste processing,
which the NGO estimates suggests amounts to
about 12 grams of GHG for every kilowatt hour
(kWh) of electricity produced from nuclear energy
(Winfield et al. 2006). In contrast, coal power
produces over 1,000 grams of GHG emissions per
kWh, natural gas 616 grams per kWh, and
hydroelectricity 17.3 grams per kWh (Table 1).
Even when taking into account the most
comprehensive look at GHG emissions from
nuclear power, they are about one percent of the
equivalent emissions from coal. Therefore, despite
the claim that nuclear power’s GHG emissions are
“far from zero,” they are much closer to zero than
those from fossil fuels.
2
Overall, however, the environmental case against
nuclear power is based on other arguments: that
nuclear waste creates serious long-term
environmental problems; that nuclear power is one
of the most expensive options; that nuclear power
impedes the development of more sustainable
options; and that the unreliability of nuclear power,
as evidenced by the prolonged shutdown of eight
CANDU units in Ontario, has led to increased
GHG emissions in that province  (Burda and Peters
2008). In fact, rather than nuclear power’s
impeding of other options, nuclear and renewable
energy options are complementary, in that nuclear
Table 1: Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Power Source, 2007
Note: Emissions from nuclear are estimated from standby generators and auxiliary boilers; other upstream and downstream emissions are not accounted for.
Source:  Author’s interpretation of GHGenius 3.11, Natural Resources Canada, 2007. 
Power Source
Emissions source Coal Natural Gas Boiler Nuclear Hydro
Subtotal from combustion 
(grams of CO2 per gigajoule)
90,333 50,112 1,947 3,586
Upstream fuel cycle emissions
(grams of CO2 per gigajoule)
3,001 6,260 582 0
Grams of CO2 per gigajoule of energy 93,334 56,372 2,529 3,586
Grams of CO2 per kWh delivered 1078.3 616.7 13.2 17.3Commentary 290 | 5
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energy supplies base load power whereas renewables
tend to be intermittent. The increase in emissions
due to the use of coal-fired power when nuclear
plants were shut down in Ontario is a reason for
better management of the nuclear plants, not for
doing away with them. 
Costs of Nuclear Energy Relative to Other
Energy Sources
Cost estimates for electricity, whether from nuclear
energy or from other sources, depend on
assumptions about the costs of construction, fuel,
decommissioning and waste management, carbon
emissions, capacity factors, time horizons, and the
discount rate. They also depend on the site and the
jurisdiction in which it is located, and on whether
it is taxpayers or investors that take on the risks
when it comes to financing. 
Although the process of reducing GHG emissions
represents a political challenge, most economists
favour putting a value on emissions as an essential
means of achieving that goal (see, for example,
Simpson, Jaccard, and Rivers 2007). This can be
done through either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade
system. Either way, it would help to ensure that
fossil-powered generation of electricity is fully
costed. Another approach, favoured by many current
governments, is to subsidize alternative energy
sources directly by funding development costs or by
paying more for electricity from those sources. 
Studies that compare unit energy costs levelled
across the lifetime of a power plant indicate that
nuclear, coal, and natural gas are broadly
competitive with one another under a reasonable
range of assumptions (World Nuclear Association
2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Other studies suggest that
electricity costs per kWh from nuclear energy are
about 10 to 25 percent higher for new nuclear
power plants than for coal and natural gas power
plants in the absence of any cost for GHG
emissions (Canadian Energy Research Institute
2004, 2006; see also Table 2). 
A review of recent cost estimates of nuclear
electricity in the United States by the Nuclear
Energy Institute (2008) provides another indication
of trends. Its study of a Connecticut utility shows
the base case for nuclear at 8.3 cents per kWh and
for natural gas combined cycle without carbon
capture at 7.6 cents. The Institute’s own modelling
shows that, with a carbon value of $30 per tonne of
CO2, the price of electricity from natural gas would
increase by 1.3 cents per kWh and that from coal
by 2.5 cents. Under most scenarios, then, electricity
from nuclear energy seems competitive with that
from natural gas and coal-fired plants.
AECL expects the capital cost of  of its new ACR to
be significantly less than those of older CANDU
models, but no examples have yet been built and
capital costs can be unpredictable. Without
factoring in the costs of CO2 emissions, coal would
be favoured slightly over the ACR reactor design; if
Table 2: Estimates of Electricity Costs, by Energy Type
Cost Estimate
Energy Type Low Range High Range
(cents per kWh)
New nuclear 5.3 7.3
Old nuclear 6.3 8.9
Coal 4.7 5.9
Gas 7.2 8.5
Sources: Canadian Energy Research Institute 2004, 2006.| 6 Commentary 290
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a cost of $15 per tonne of CO2 emissions were
included, however, electricity from the ACR would
cost the same as that from coal – indeed, higher
carbon values would tilt the balance in favour of
the ACR (Canadian Energy Research Institute
2004, p. 18). On the other hand, merchant
financing, the proposed source of funding for a new
reactor at Point Lepreau, New Brunswick, has
higher financing and tax costs than does public
financing, which would add about 40 percent to
the cost of nuclear power but only about 20 percent
to the cost of coal-fired power. 
The effect on plant revenue of placing a value on
carbon emissions can be estimated roughly in the
following way. A 1,000 MW nuclear plant
operating at 80 percent capacity will generate 7
terawatt hours of electricity per year; at 6 cents per
kilowatt hour, this represents $420 million of
revenue per year. A 1,000 MW coal-fired plant will
emit about 6 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent per
year, while a comparable nuclear plant will have
negligible emissions. At a modest value of $30 per
tonne of CO2, emissions would cost the coal-fired
plant $180 million in annual revenue, a significant
share of total revenue.  The clear conclusion is that
nuclear power becomes a very cost competitive
option once modest costs on carbon are imposed.
Subsidization Issues
Nuclear energy has also been criticized for the level
of subsidization it receives from government. In
Canada, several funding elements of nuclear energy
have been characterized as subsidies:
￿ some of the costs of supporting R&D at the
Chalk River laboratories – about $120 million
per year – plus additional funding of $300
million in the 2008 federal budget for
refurbishment and infrastructure expenses
(AECL 2008) and $351 million in the 2009
budget for similar expenses and for the ACR
design, plus $100 million in emergency
funding for refurbishing older CANDU
reactors (McCarthy 2009);
￿ support for new CANDU and other reactor
designs, amounting to several hundred million
dollars over several years – the federal
government has paid for about half of the $400
million spent on the ACR to date (AECL 2008); 
￿ legacy wastes and liabilities, amounting to $520
million over five years (2006-11), with
significant expenses beyond that period and a
present value (the current value expected future
costs when discounted by the interest rate or
some other discount rate) of about $3 billion
(AECL 2008); 
￿ limits on nuclear liability for insurance
purposes beyond about $650 million in the
proposed new legislation, Bill C-5, which was
intended to replace the Nuclear Liability Act;  
￿ support for CANDU exports in terms of, for
example, loans and loan guarantees, amounting
to several billions of dollars – here, the subsidy
would be the difference, if any, between the
government-backed financing rate and the
normal commercial rate; and 
￿ the costs of reactor cost overruns, shutdowns,
restarts, and refurbishments in Ontario in the
1990s that were borne by provincial taxpayers and
ratepayers, amounting to several billions of dollars. 
On reflection, however, many of these costs are not
“subsidies” per se. Some – such as for R&D and
new reactor design – could also be seen as
investments, while some of the R&D costs at
Chalk River are for fundamental science and for the
production of radioisotopes for medical purposes,
not just for the support of CANDU business. The
legacy liabilities were incurred for a variety of policy
reasons going back a long way, including defence in
the 1950s, and fundamental science and medical
goals. As well, there is a low likelihood of invoking
loan guarantees for CANDU exports because the
national governments of importing countries are
likely to fully support investments there, as nuclear
plants are a vital part of a country’s infrastructure.
There are, moreover, international guidelines for
government support of nuclear plant exports. The
limits on nuclear liability would be relevant only in
the unlikely event of a serious accident. In any case,
companies cannot pay more than they are worth, so
ultimate responsibility beyond that limit would
devolve on governments regardless. Finally, to theextent that nuclear costs are built into the price of
electricity and paid by ratepayers, one could argue
they are not subsidies, while the costs of shutdowns
and startups in Ontario were due much more to
utility management than to the CANDU
technology.
3 In short, while it is clearly difficult to
make precise assignments, we suggest that direct
subsidies to the CANDU business are likely to be
less than $200 million per year on a continuing
basis, mainly for R&D and for the ACR design.
Thus, to answer the question of whether nuclear
power is competitive relative to the alternatives,
federal and provincial policymakers need to look at
broader analyses and comparative systematic data
and information on all these energy sources. And
they should keep in mind that, although nuclear
energy does not completely incorporate the costs of
its environmental externalities into the price of the
electricity it produces, it does so to a much greater
extent than do fossil fuels. 
Accordingly, any full comparison of subsidies to
various energy sources should take into account:
￿ major federal government support for oil and
gas energy research and development via tax
breaks and the direct spending of federal labs
and agencies;
￿ similar support by provinces as resource
owners;
￿ subsidies for highways and infrastructure that
underpin oil and gas use in vehicles and
buildings;
￿ the failure to price the emissions of fossil fuels,
which constitutes a “subsidy” that is not
aggregated into comparative subsidy estimate
summaries; and 
￿ federal and some provincial subsidization of
carbon capture and storage technology, costs
which are likely to grow significantly.
The value of such subsidization to these other
energy industries is, of course, difficult to assess,
although figures for the value of carbon emissions
are indicative. On a national scale, the 80 million
tonnes of CO2-equivalent offset annually by
nuclear power relative to coal would be worth
about $2.4 billion per year at a value of $30 per
tonne of emissions – a significant amount when
compared with any estimated value of subsidies
provided to nuclear energy in Canada.
International comparisons are also instructive.
The governments of the leading exporters of
nuclear power technology, such as the United
States, France, and Japan, all fund much larger
national R&D programs to support their nuclear
industry than does Canada, even after taking into
account the differences in the scale of their
programs. They also support nuclear export
projects. In the United States, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 provides up to US$2 billion for the first six
new domestic nuclear plants to cover the cost of
overruns due to delays, and a production tax credit
of up to US$125 million per year per reactor. These
are substantial offsets for the capital costs of new
nuclear plants. 
It is true that AECL will have significant ongoing
costs that will be covered by the federal govern-
ment. Some of these, such as the legacy wastes and
the need to maintain a licensed site at Chalk River,
will be required no matter what happens to AECL.
Other costs will depend on how much Ottawa
chooses to invest in maintaining the CANDU
design as a nuclear option for Canada, as well as the
role it sees for medical radioisotopes and for funda-
mental nuclear science. It might wish to transfer
some of the costs and risks of the CANDU to the
private sector, although private sector firms have
also been known to ask for government subsidies.
In conclusion, when one factors in the full costs
of health and environmental effects, including air-
quality issues, nuclear power is less expensive than
the alternative sources of base load electricity.
Moreover, those health and environmental costs are
likely to increase in the future. As well, the tangible
monetary subsidies given to nuclear power are not
very different in kind, although somewhat smaller,
Commentary 290 | 7
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3 Carl Andognini, a U.S. consultant who examined Ontario’s nuclear plant performance in the 1990s and then became the chief nuclear executive at
Ontario Hydro, said that the poor performance of Ontario Hydro’s CANDUs was “…not a technology problem. It’s a managerial problem.” See Greg
Crone and Richard Brennan. 1997. “Ontario’s nuclear strategy bombed.” Montreal Gazette. August 14.than the implicit subsidies to other types of energy
for the right to emit CO2 at no cost. Finally, if the
provinces, especially Ontario, were willing to make
a commitment to purchase the new ACR design,
this could justify some ongoing federal subsidies for
its research and development. 
The Privatization Option: 
Looking for Serious Money 
The second question we pose – and it is closely
linked to the first – is whether AECL should be
privatized.
AECL ’s Mandate and its Investment and
Competitive Realities
As Canada’s national nuclear reactor designer and
vendor, AECL sells the CANDU reactor, manages
most new CANDU projects, and contracts to a
range of private suppliers and consultants for
components and engineering. As we have seen, it
also carries out nuclear R&D and radioisotope
production at its Chalk River laboratories in
Ontario. It can be characterized as a mid-sized
engineering company, with annual commercial
revenues of around $500 million.
AECL has reasonable prospects of making some
CANDU sales over the next decade, as well as
refurbishing existing CANDU reactors. In the
export market, AECL has a good track record of
building CANDUs in developing and emerging
countries, having been effectively shut out of
developed country markets by the early widespread
adoption of the LWR. The company needs money,
however, to refurbish the Chalk River labs, to
complete the ACR design, and, possibly, to support
ACR sales abroad, in addition to the ongoing need
to fund its legacy waste liabilities at Chalk River. A
partial privatization of AECL would help to resolve
some of these issues.
The federal decision on support for AECL and
Ontario’s decision on what technology and vendor
to choose for its new reactors are intertwined
(Purchase 2008). As emphasized above, if Ontario
opts for the CANDU, it would be a big boost for
AECL. If it does not, and if no other domestic
CANDU orders emerge, AECL probably would be
consigned to refurbishing existing CANDUs, as
foreign customers likely would not buy a new
reactor from AECL that had not been purchased in
Canada. Refurbishing is a good business in its own
right, but it does not provide the same stream of
long-term business as the design and building of
new reactors. A decision by Ontario to go with the
CANDU would allow the Canadian nuclear
industry to carry on with much the same roles and
structure, although privatization of AECL’s
CANDU business could bring changes. If Ontario
opts for another vendor, AECL would look for
benefits from access to new technologies and
markets, but it could also face the loss of much of
the business from new CANDU sales. 
A 2007 report by the auditor general suggested
that AECL faces certain critical challenges,
particularly the development and licensability of
the ACR in time to meet market requirements and
the replacement of aging facilities at its Chalk River
Laboratories (Auditor General of Canada 2007, 2).
4
Despite AECL’s receipt of an additional $34 million
from the federal government to address urgent
health and safety issues at Chalk River, the report
noted that “a source of funding for the other
significant costs had not yet been identified.” The
challenge for AECL is that its mandate is not
defined in an act of Parliament; rather, it functions
through an annual corporate plan approved by the
federal government. Moreover, AECL does not
have borrowing powers, and must have government
approval for key decisions such as investment in
capital assets. Most government ministers, however,
see few political positives to nuclear power issues
but many negatives, and have not made nuclear
energy a budgetary or political priority until
recently. Thus, the costs and subsidy aspects of our
first question are entwined with the partial
privatization question.
C.D. Howe Institute
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Privatization Options
The federal government is currently reviewing
AECL’s situation, and has indicated the likelihood
of the company’s full or partial privatization and to
different ways of managing the Chalk River site.
Should AECL succeed in obtaining contracts for
new ACRs in Ontario and New Brunswick, its
value to the federal government would be
enhanced, making it a more attractive target. Likely
private investors would be Areva, as well as
Canadian firms such as SNC-
Lavalin and Bruce Power. For
Areva, the main attraction
would be to acquire new
intellectual property linked to
reactor design, R&D, waste
storage, and fuel recycling,
not to mention the important
assets of highly qualified
nuclear engineering and
research personnel and
possibly some of the facilities
and capabilities at Chalk
River. 
The goal of the current privatization review
appears to be to establish a strategic partnership
that would be linked to Ontario’s reactor decision.
Privatization could help to clarify roles and
contribute to funding nuclear R&D and design
work, although maintenance and legacy costs
would remain. At the same time, the federal
government will want to protect Canadian high-
technology jobs at AECL and in the nuclear supply
companies as much as possible. Keeping the
CANDU design capability would maintain jobs in
that critical area and help to ensure business for
Canadian companies that have experience with the
CANDU supply chain. Private investors could bring
renewed drive and discipline, along with new ideas
about developing and marketing the CANDU
system, fuel cycle work, and extracting better value
from Chalk River.
Although the federal-Ontario relationship is
crucial, strategic partnerships are also possible with
other provinces. If Alberta and Saskatchewan
became serious about investing in nuclear energy,
the federal-provincial dynamics would become
more complex, as these provinces would want some
say in nuclear development. Such input likely
would be handled through normal federal-
provincial energy relations, however, rather than
through some kind of ownership role in a partially
privatized AECL.
Privatization discussions and debate inevitably
raise policy concerns about what constitutes the
nuclear “industry” now and in the future. Should
policy focus on the nuclear industry “in Canada,”
with a related concern for jobs,
or on the “Canadian nuclear
industry,” a broader definition
with an emphasis on
investment and exports?
Privatization also raises the
concern that, while there are
advantages to being part of a
larger and perhaps more
efficient organization, there are
also risks. In time, a large, new
private owner could decide
simply to shut down AECL’s
facilities and product lines and
offer key staff jobs elsewhere, with deleterious effects
on the CANDU supply industry. On the other
hand, a private owner of AECL would very likely
include significant Canadian content in new reactors
that it supplied, even if they were not CANDUs. 
The Ontario government’s view of privatization
is centred on its stated preference to select the right
nuclear reactor technology at the right price and in
a competitive market, rather than being pressured
to “buy Canadian” and “buy Ontario” by
purchasing CANDU reactors from AECL. But
advantages would accrue to AECL as an Ontario-
centred company and to the Ontario and federal
governments if a partially privatized AECL had 
a partnership in a second kind of reactor product
with access to the global market for reactor
contracts in the United Kingdom, the United
States, and China. Moreover, should privatization
of AECL lead to lower costs for customers, 
Ontario would be the direct beneficiary.
The search for privatization and related
partnership options has arisen not just because of
AECL’s serious funding needs, but also because
Private investors could bring
renewed drive and discipline,
along with new ideas about
developing and marketing the
CANDU system, fuel cycle
work, and extracting better
value from Chalk River.C.D. Howe Institute
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AECL is a relatively small company and the owner
of a minority technology competing in a global
nuclear reactor market in which it accounts for only
about 6 percent of the 439 reactors operating in the
world (Nuclear Energy Agency 2008, 50).
Moreover, Canada did not participate in the
consolidation of the nuclear reactor industry in the
1980s and 1990s that led to the shedding of
unprofitable nuclear divisions of large companies
(Secor 2007, 24). Today, the Canadian nuclear
industry’s competitors follow business models
ranging from Areva’s vertical-integration approach
across the nuclear power generation supply chain to
the focus of GE and Westinghouse on reactor
design, building, and servicing in the context of a
larger organization. 
Privatization of AECL, however, raises issues of
its possible adverse effects on nuclear proliferation,
regulatory concerns, and a lessened Canadian
nuclear identity and science capacity. Nuclear
proliferation and regulatory concerns are unlikely
to be harmed by a partial privatization option –
indeed, the federal government might become
more vigilant because it would no longer, in a
sense, be regulating itself but, rather, a private firm.
As for nuclear identity and science capacity,
depending on which option was chosen,
privatization in fact might preserve and enhance
both by more clearly delineating the public goods
and private roles in nuclear energy matters. When
AECL’s privatization has been contemplated in the
past, potential private investors naturally have
supposed that they would assume the company’s
commercial operations while the federal govern-
ment would maintain the public goods of research
costs. From the government’s perspective, however,
that would mean absorbing all such costs with no
offsetting revenues. Thus, any attempt at partial
privatization would have to find a way to obtain 
the needed commercial investment and entre-
preneurial expertise and capacity while allowing 
the federal government to defend its actions against
the charge that it is selling a public asset without
public benefit.
Partial privatization would involve choosing
among at least three options: creating a new mixed
enterprise; selling the commercial assets to a private
firm or firms; or devising a new national public-
private government laboratory model for Chalk
River. The first option could involve the sale of
AECL to a new, mixed-enterprise corporate entity
with shares owned by the federal government and
by another private nuclear firm or firms in some
agreed proportion. In addition, there would have to
be public agreements or statutory provisions
regarding ongoing federal or joint funding of
financial obligations for the financing of the public
goods aspects of AECL’s role at Chalk River. The
new entity’s governing board of directors would
have to be appointed in a manner that reflected the
balance of joint ownership. Canada has had some
experience with such formal mixed enterprises – for
example, the case of Telesat Canada.
The second partial privatization option would be
to sell the CANDU commercial-related assets but
leave the Chalk River assets with a reconstituted
AECL (whose reduced mandate would need a new
statutory basis). It is likely that the reactor
refurbishment business would also be a part of the
private entity rather than stay with AECL. The
reconstituted AECL could be given a more definitive
funding structure from the federal government since
it would not be able to self-finance to the same
extent that AECL previously had.
A third model or element of a privatization
package, Chalk River as a restructured national
laboratory, is inherent in the first two options but
would be made much more explicit. It would also
address more frontally the federal government’s
need for a new way to maintain and build the
public goods R&D function. Under this option,
Chalk River, as a part of the remaining
noncommercial AECL, could be converted into a
public-private national laboratory. Federal funding
for the laboratory could be provided, but
withdrawn or reduced over ten years or so, to be
replaced by new partnership funding and/or
contracting arrangements. Federal laboratories
already have varied structures and funding, so a
restructured national nuclear research lab could join
other energy labs such as the Natural Resources
Canada’s Devon lab, near Edmonton, which
supports the Alberta oil sands through partnered
funding (see Doern and Kinder 2007). In fact, theIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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federal government has already received a contract
study from the National Bank that, though not yet
public, reportedly recommends that Ottawa sell at
least 51 percent of AECL but retain ownership of
Chalk River (Howlett and McCarthy 2009).
Regardless of which option might be chosen,
further agreements between the federal government
and any privatized entity would also have to be
negotiated. In negotiating the partial privatization
of AECL, the federal government could learn some
lessons from the contentious relations between
AECL and MDS-Nordion in the wake of the
cancellation of the MAPLE isotope production
reactors (see footnote 4). The key issue was the
desire of MDS-Nordion to have a guaranteed
supply of isotopes. MDS-Nordion now seeks $1.6
billion in damages from AECL.
The fundamental contractual problem is one of
risk. AECL carried the risk of the MAPLE reactors
not being licensable; now, with the ACR design still
incomplete, there is a risk that it will not be
commercially viable. It thus seems appropriate to
differentiate the kinds of risk that governments
should take on (such as those that affect public
well-being concerning safety and regulatory risks, as
well as those involved in basic science R&D) and
those that should be passed on to a private
corporation (such as market and construction risks,
and the risks of applied R&D linked to specific
commercial products). Accordingly, it might make
sense to consider a partial privatization of AECL
only after the ACR  is certified but before
construction begins.
The federal government should also pay close to
attention to guarantees, whether implicit or explicit.
For instance, if it were to sell the CANDU business
but retain responsibility for Chalk River, Ottawa
likely would have to guarantee some level of R&D in
basic science relevant to the CANDU design.
Conversely, in return, such a guarantee could require
from the buyer a minimal level of ongoing applied
CANDU R&D business in order to justify further
investment in Chalk River. This would also have an
impact on the sale price of the CANDU business.
Nuclear Regulatory Challenges
Our third and final question centres on whether
there is a need for new approaches to nuclear
regulation. In our view, federal energy policymakers
should devise explicit mechanisms that assess more
systematically and deal with changes in relative risk
across the larger nuclear regulatory regime, which
consists of several bodies. For instance, the isotope
supply crisis of late 2007 was due to a clash between
the need for reactor safety and the risk of going
without medical isotopes, with different agencies
responsible for the different risks. The nuclear
regulatory regime also needs modernizing through
statutory changes in the mandate of the Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), particularly
regarding the licensing of new nuclear reactors.
The nuclear regulatory regime necessarily has to
deal with the combined issues of health and safety
and relative risk assessments in domains such as
nuclear reactors, isotope production, use, and
transportation; the timely and efficient licensing of
nuclear reactors; and the long-term storage of
nuclear wastes (see Doern, Dorman, and Morrison
2001; Stoett 2003). Issues of reactor safety clearly
involve assessments of relative risk (for example,
reactor safety versus isotope production) and
diverse notions of risks versus benefits. Timely
licensing issues centre around regulatory efficiency,
speed of decisionmaking, and regulatory
compliance in an era when the ideas of economic
and technological innovation in concert with
effective public safety are increasingly important
(see Doern 2007).
The nuclear regulatory regime also might have a
different central dynamic if AECL were partially
privatized, since the federal government would no
longer be regulating a Crown corporation but a
much larger commercial corporate and business
presence with international implications.
The Nuclear Regulatory Regime in Brief
Canada’s nuclear regulatory regime is mainly a
federal responsibility and consists of several policy
and regulatory agencies. Both Natural Resources
Canada and Industry Canada promote the industry,
while the former initiates energy policy and legisla-tive change with five other organizations concerned
with safety, nuclear waste, and health matters.
5
Natural resources minister Gary Lunn announced
in June 2007 that he had accepted the approach
recommended by the federal Nuclear Waste
Management Organization (NWMO) for
managing used nuclear fuel, including the isolation
and containment of used fuel deep underground
with an option for temporary shallow underground
storage. The NWMO recommended going one step
at a time and leaving as much flexibility as possible
to future policymakers. Site selection will take years
and will be a regulatory and management challenge
of immense complexity involving the need to
manage wastes over a period of hundreds and even
thousands of years. There is also a contentious
debate about current and future nuclear costs and
economics and who should pay for them; the intent
is that electricity consumers should pay, but there
are many uncertainties about the magnitude of the
costs and their profile over time.
6
In our view, federal policymakers need to ensure
that demonstrable progress occurs on the actual site
selection for a nuclear waste management facility,
since this is an important factor in gaining public
approval for nuclear energy, and would remain a
federal concern even if the nuclear industry were
closed down. Although the next steps reside with
the NWMO, the federal government should
support steady, visible progress in this area, and
have a comprehensive and credible regulatory and
approval process in place, with full cooperation
among the CNSC, Environment Canada, and the
relevant provincial agencies. 
The most recent regulatory issue to make
headlines was the demotion and later resignation of
the head of the CSNC (Calamai 2008), which
arose because of serious communication problems
between the CNSC and AECL about the safety of
the reactor used to produce medical isotopes,
coupled with confusion about who in Ottawa was
responsible for what risks (see Morrison and
Meneley 2008). Although the isotope crisis led to
political controversy, it revealed an underlying
policy problem of the nuclear regulatory regime’s
incapacity to deal with changes in relative risks, not
just with respect to commercial reactors. Thus,
federal policymakers should design review
mechanisms across the array of nuclear regulatory
bodies and agencies, and across the range of
changing relative risks, to assess periodically the
relative risk agenda to be addressed and ways to
manage it, including funding needs related to
regulatory capacity. Annual assessments probably
are not practical, but regular assessments certainly
should be adopted and made public.
The CNSC and the Changed Political
Economy of Reactor Licensing
While the entire nuclear regulatory regime is crucial
to the public’s concerns about nuclear safety and
risk, the CNSC faces some inherent regulatory
challenges, particularly regarding nuclear reactor
regulatory licensing.
With the transformation of the Atomic Energy
Control Board into the CNSC in 2001, nuclear
regulation in Canada has moved from a
performance-based system to a more compliance-
based or detailed command-and-control approach
(see Jackson and de la Mothe 2001, 97-98). The
latter had also been the preferred approach of the
US nuclear regulatory body for decades, and was
reinforced by the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
reactor accidents in the 1970s and 1980s. More
recently, however, the US regulator has evolved in
the direction of greater flexibility. 
Under Canada’s earlier regulatory system, control
was exercised through a dialogue among experts on
both sides, but, under new legislation and with its
greatly increased staff, the CNSC has become much
more prescriptive and document oriented.
Interestingly, a study of the isotope crisis, jointly
commissioned by AECL and the CNSC,
C.D. Howe Institute
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5 The five bodies are the CNSC; Health Canada’s Radiation Protection Bureau; the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency; Transport Canada
(with respect to the transportation of dangerous or irradiated goods); and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization, which was established by
federal legislation but is funded by provincial utilities.
6 While long-term waste storage has been a serious regulatory challenge for nuclear energy for some time, a similar challenge is emerging with respect to
long-term carbon storage in underground facilities and locations in many different potential locations across Canada.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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recommended that more formal documentation,
monitoring, and communication protocols be
established even as industry forces were pressing for
a more timely and efficient licensing system
(Talisman International 2008). 
The CNSC’s main regulatory experience has
been with Canadian-made CANDU reactors
operated in Canada. Recently, however, the CNSC
has been moving toward international standards for
reactor regulation that, in principle, are technology
neutral (CNSC 2006, 3). Although national
requirements are built into the international
regime, some CANDU supporters argue for a
made-in-Canada regulatory approach (see, for
example, Boyd 2007), on the grounds that
international standards might be influenced by the
regulatory requirements of the internationally
dominant LWR and thus work against the
CANDU.
The CNSC’s licensing process for new reactors
proceeds through four stages: environmental
assessment, which can take up to three years, and
the granting of licences to prepare a site, to
construct, and to operate (CNSC 2006, 13). In
fact, however, no new reactors have been licensed
for some time, and the CNSC does not have any
separate licensing processes for the refurbishment of
existing reactors. As a result, it is unknown whether
international estimates that it takes about ten years
for a new nuclear reactor to be assessed, licensed,
and put into operation would apply in Canada.
The CNSC’s regulatory role focuses pre-
eminently on safety and risk assessment, but
increasingly also on efficiency in regulatory
licensing. This means that the federal government
must continue to give it the budgetary and staffing
resources it needs to meet these twin mandates.
However, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act needs
to be amended to make these mandates explicit,
since the statute currently contains no explicit
economic and procedural efficiency clauses.
The Need for Policy Change
Given rising demand for electricity and the need to
reduce GHG and other emissions, nuclear power,
along with renewable sources and conservation, can
be a much more important source of Canada’s
overall energy supply. Nuclear energy has clear
environmental advantages over fossil fuels with
respect to GHG emissions and reliability
advantages over renewable energy sources in the
provision of base load energy. Moreover, increasing
calls for carbon storage on the part of fossil fuel
industries suggest that the nuclear industry will no
longer be alone in having to deal with the long-
term health, environmental, and regulatory effects
of its wastes. The fulfilling of nuclear energy’s
promise, however, is highly conditional on the
resolution of concerns raised by the public and
NGOs about safety, risks, and costs. Although there
is uncertainty about the degree to which the adverse
environmental effects of both nuclear energy and
fossil fuel energy sources are factored into their
prices, the Canadian nuclear industry has made a
greater effort, mandated by federal policy and
regulation, to contain its wastes and to fund its
future management than have the fossil fuel energy
industries. Policymakers, therefore, should hold
these other energy sources to the same standards
that exist for nuclear energy, and ensure that the
relative levels of environmentally linked costs and
subsidization of all these energy sources become a
central and explicit feature of energy policy.
At the same time, policymakers should consider
seriously the partial privatization of AECL, which
would result in the funding, ownership, and
partnership structures and capacities that the
Canadian nuclear industry needs to compete
globally. The alternative is significantly more
taxpayer subsidization of and investment in AECL
to permit it to embark on new reactor and fuel
cycle designs, a renewal of its research capabilities,
and the development of export markets. However,
whether partial privatization involves the
establishment of a new mixed enterprise| 14 Commentary 290
corporation or the sale of AECL’s commercial assets
and activity to private owners, the federal
government would need to play an ongoing role in
maintaining the public good of the R&D functions
of the Chalk River laboratory, perhaps as a joint
publicly and privately funded national institution.
Finally, regulatory policy needs to be amended to
deal systematically with the full multi-agency
nuclear regulatory regime and with a range of
changing relative risks, not just one regulator or one
regulation or one risk at a time. Policymakers need
to devise mechanisms to assess changing relative
risks and to give a much higher priority to selecting
sites for nuclear wastes, which will remain a
continuing federal responsibility even if the nuclear
industry were to be closed down. Moreover, the
legislation governing the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission CNSC should be amended to ensure
that its obligation to provide effective and efficient
licensing processes are added explicitly to its core
mandate of safety and risk management, especially
considering the changed political economy of
nuclear reactor regulatory licensing.
In short, Canada’s federal and provincial energy
policymakers need to cooperate more fully to assure
the public, through support of the long-term safety
and efficacy of CANDU reactor technology, that
nuclear energy is ready and able to take its rightful
place in the national energy mix.
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